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1 Introduction
This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with
externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can choose their strate-
gies before the outside players. The idea that forming coalition can move first is
motivated by the observation that in many economic environment, objections to
cooperative agreements are carried out by directly choosing strategy in the ongoing
strategic form game. Firms defecting from an industrial cartel can simply set a lower
price; countries wishing not to comply with internationally agreed pollution abate-
ments can simply set higher levels of production, and so on. In these cases, forming
coalitions seem to exploit a positional advantage, very much as Stackelberg lead-
ers, while outside players optimally react as followers. We accordingly construct a
characteristic function assigning to each coalition its equilibrium payoff in an ap-
propriately defined sequential game in which it moves as a Stackelberg leader. We
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study the core of the associated cooperative game and establish sufficient conditions
on the underlying strategic form game for the existence of core imputations.
The problem of defining a characteristic function in games with externalities is
a wellknown problem in cooperative game theory. Since the payoff of each player
is affected by all the strategic choices made in the game, coalitional possibilities
cannot be defined independently of the behaviour of external players. The relevance
of these considerations becomes apparent once we observe that externalities are a
common feature of most economic problems in which group formation is a relevant
issue: cartel formation in oligopolies, international cooperation on trade, monetary
and environmental issues, joint ventures, R&D associations and so on. This prob-
lem was in fact already considered by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), who
conceived the characteristic function of a coalitional game as the maximal aggre-
gate payoff that a coalition can guarantee to its members (see also Aumann (1959)).
Their formulation, in which players in the complementary coalition minimize the
payoff of the forming coalition, does not address the problem of how coalitions
make rational predictions about the reaction of excluded players. This is an open
and highly debated issue in the theory of cooperation. Some important contribu-
tions have attempted to develope a general analysis by imposing consistency re-
quirements on the overall coalition structure induced by the formation of a coali-
tion (see Ray and Vohra (1997), Ray and Vohra (1999)), or by studying games of
coalition formation (Hart and Kurz (1983), Bloch (1996), Bloch (1997), Yi (1997)).
Other contributions have addressed specific economic problems by directly intro-
ducing assumptions on the predicted behaviour of outside players. In particular,
Chander and Tulkens (1997) study the core of an economy with multilateral exter-
nalities adopting the following logical construct. A coalition formation rule, given
ex ante, specifies the predicted coalition structure induced by the formation of every
coalition. In particular, they propose that all players excluded from a forming coali-
tion simply organize themselves into singletons. This rule is strictly related to the
gamma game of coalition formation studied by Hart and Kurtz (1983), in which the
decision of a subcoalition of players to separate from an existing coalition induces
the remaining players to split up into singletons.1 Given this coalition formation
rule, the strategies induced in the underlying strategic form game by the formation
of a coalition S are then naturally determined by letting S and each player outside
S simultaneously maximize their own payoff. In this logic, Chander and Tulkens
determine the value v(S) as the Nash equilibrium payoff of S in the strategic form
game played by S, acting as a single player, and by excluded players, acting as
singletons. Because of the simultaneity of strategic choices, we will refer to this
approach as simultaneous conversion of a strategic form game. To give a simple
1 This rule should be contrasted with the other rule studied by Hart and Kurz, the delta
rule, prescribing that all players announcing the same coalition finally belong to the same
coalition (not necessarily the one they announced). Differently from the gamma game, if
a coalition of players leaves a bigger coalition, the remaining players form the comple-
mentary coalition. For alternative asumptions on how excluded coalitions reorganize after
defections, see Carraro and Siniscalco (1993).
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example, consider three firms with linear technology competing a` la Cournot in a
linear demand market. Let a and b be the demand parameters and c be the marginal
cost. If all firms merge together, they get the monopoly payoff v ({1, 2, 3}) = A4 ,
where A = (a− c)2 /b. If two firms, say firms 1 and 2, jointly leave the merger, a
simultaneous duopoly game is played between the joint firm {1, 2} and firm 3, with
equilibrium payoff v ({1, 2}) = A9 . Similarly, if a single firm i leaves the merger,
a triopoly game is played, with symmetric payoffs A16 = v({i}) (these payoffs are
obtained from the general expression A(n−s+2)2 expressing firms’ profits in an n
firm oligopoly). It can easily be checked that the equal split imputation ( A12 , A12 , A12)
is in the core. However, other asymmetric imputations belong to the core, such as(
3A
32 .
3A
32 ,
A
16
)
, giving player 3 his reservation value v({3}) and equally splitting the
rest between the other two players.
The simultaneous conversion implicitly assumes that coalitional payoffs orig-
inate in two stages: a coalition formation stage, in which the coalition structure
forms; a strategic form game, in which Nash strategies are played by each coalition.
In fact, Nash strategies are a predictable outcome only if all elements of the game
(the set of players, i.e., the elements of the newly formed coalition structure, their
payoff functions and strategy sets) are commonly known. In other terms, deviations
from a generally agreed joint strategy are carried out by first publicly abandoning the
negotiation process (as, for instance, a group of countries leaving the international
negotiation table) and then playing the Nash equilibrium strategies of the induced
simultaneous game. Although appropriate in certain cooperative environments, the
simultaneous conversion fails to capture the dynamic nature of coalition formation
that we claimed is common to several economic problems. As we argued at the be-
ginning, coalitions can often deviate by directly choosing an alternative strategy in
the underlying game, as do firms defecting from an industrial cartel by directly and
unexpectedly setting a lower price. In order to explore this idea, we construct a char-
acteristic function formally expressing the assumption that forming coalitions can
move first. We stress here that we do not attempt to endogenize the coalition struc-
ture induced by a deviation, but we adopt the gamma assumption used in Chander
and Tulkens (1997).2 More precisely, we derive the coalitional value vφ(S) as the
perfect equilibrium payoff of S in the sequential game in which S chooses a strategy
as leader, and the players in the complementary coalition N\S react simultaneously
and noncooperatively. We refer to this operation as sequential conversion of the
gamma game, denoted by (N, vφ).
As an illustration of this approach, consider again the Cournot oligopoly ex-
ample used above for the simultaneous conversion. As before, the grand coalition
obtains the monopolistic profit v ({1, 2, 3}) = A4 . Now, if firms 1 and 2 jointly leave
the merger, a Stackelberg quantity setting game with the joint firm {1, 2} as leader
2 Although the definition of a characteristic function along these lines is compatible with
any arbitrary coalition formation rule, we choose to focus on the gamma rule from the
beginning to avoid confusion. However, we point out that proposition 1 extends to any
coalition formation rule.
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and firm 3 as follower originates. The leader’s payoffs is given by v({1, 2}) = A8 .
If a single firm, say firm 1, deviates, it becomes the leader in the sequential game in
which firms 2 and 3 simultaneously set their quantities at the second stage. Firm 1’s
profit in equilibrium is given by A12 = v({1}) (these numbers are obtained from the
general expression A4(n−s+1) expressing the payoff of a leader with (n−s) followers
in a Stackelberg game). We use this example to discuss the main properties of the se-
quential conversion, formally established in the paper. We first note that every proper
subcoalition of players does strictly better under the sequential conversion than un-
der the simultaneous conversion. This directly implies that the sequential core is
strictly included in the simultaneous core. As will be shown in theorem 1, this is a
generic property for smooth games. Secondly, in the above example the sequential
core consists of a unique, symmetric, imputation. Under the assumed linear struc-
ture, this remains true for any number of players. Unfortunately, the greater power of
deviating coalitions under the sequential conversions yields an empty core as soon
as the linear structure of the example is abandoned. In fact, since the above Cournot
oligopoly exhibits strategic substitutes, forming coalitions (moving as Stackelberg
leaders) enjoy a first mover advantage, and the profitability of deviations rule out
the existence of stable imputations. Following the same intuition, stable coopera-
tive outcomes could emerge when the power of deviating coalitions is less strong,
that is, when the game has strategic complements. We show in proposition 1 that all
smooth, symmetric games with strategic complements have a nonempty core. This
nonemptiness result trivially extends to the simultaneous conversion.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the general setup,
introducing and comparing the simultaneous and the sequential conversions. Sec-
tion 3 presents our existence result. Section 4 illustrates, in the framework of some
wellknown economic applications, the mechanics underlying the existence result:
the core is nonempty when leaders cannot exploit their positional advantage too
much. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
We consider a set of players N = {1, .., i, .., n}, each endowed with a set Xi ⊂ R
of feasible actions and a payoff function ui : X → R, where X ≡
∏
i∈N
Xi. For
each S ⊆ N we denote by uS : X → R the function defined for all x ∈ X by
uS (x) ≡
∑
i∈S
ui (x). We assume that utility is transferable, so that uS (x) is a well
defined index of the aggregate utility of S. We will only consider continuous pay-
off functions. The strategic form game Γ =
(
N, (Xi, ui)i∈N
)
is obtained from the
above elements. A Nash equilibrium x of the game Γ is defined in the usual way.
We will be considering games Γ (S, xS) derived by Γ restricting the set of play-
ers to a coalition N\S and fixing the strategies of the players in S to some vector
xS , with payoff functions defined in the obvious way. We will assume throughout
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the paper that the game Γ and Γ (S, xS) admits a unique Nash Equilibrium for all
S ⊂ N and xS ∈ XS . Although this may seem a strong restriction, we anticipate
here that for the class of games covered by theorem 1 (supermodular games) our as-
sumption of symmetric externalities (assumption 2) guarantees that Nash equilibria
are Pareto rankable. We may therefore argue that, if multiple equilibria should exist,
the optimal equilibrium would be chosen through some pre-play communication.
We will associate to the game Γ various cooperative games (N, v) by specifying
characteristic functions v : 2N → R+, where v(S) expresses the maximal aggregate
payoff attainable by coalition S in Γ . An imputation for (N, v) is a vector z ∈ Rn+
such that
∑
i∈N
zi ≤ v (N) and zi ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N .
Definition 1. The core of the cooperative game (N, v), denoted C (N, v), is the set
of imputations z ∈ Rn+ such that
∑
i∈S
zi ≥ v (S) for all S ⊆ N .
2.2 Simultaneous Conversion
As argued in the introductory section, the simultaneous approach to the derivation
of a characteristic function for the game Γ views the value v(S) as resulting from
an implicit two stage process. At the first stage players announce coalitions, and a
coalition structure including S forms according to some specific coalition formation
rule. At the second stage, the formed coalitions play the Nash equilibrium strategy
of the induced game. In this paper we will consider the gamma coalition formation
rule, predicting that if a coalition S forms and breaks the agreement within the grand
coalition, no other coalition forms, and outside players split up into singletons. This
rule seems appropriate in some specific institutional settings: in some instances of
international environmental agreements, for instance, treaties require the formation
of at most one coalition (see, for instance, Murdoch and Sandler (1997) on the reg-
ulation of chlorofluorocarbon emissions). Similarly, the assumption of one coalition
with fringe outside players is extensively used in the theory of industrial organiza-
tion for the analysis of horizontal mergers (see Salant et al.(1983), Deneckere and
Davidson (1985), Shaffer (1995)).
Formally, we associate with each coalition S the coalition structure πγ (S) whose
elements are S and all players outside S as singletons. Letting Γ (πγ (S)) denote
the strategic form game played by the elements of πγ (S), the characteristic function
vγ(S) is thus defined as the aggregate payoff of S in the (unique) Nash equilibrium
x¯ of the game Γ (πγ (S)), i.e.,
vγ(S) =
∑
i∈S
ui (x¯) . (1)
2.3 Sequential Conversion
The sequential conversion captures the idea that in some situations, coalitions can
deviate from a joint agreement by simply changing their strategies in the underlying
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normal form game. Outside players, at least for some transitional period, have to
react to coalitional deviations by choosing their strategies very much as followers in
a Stackelberg game. Again, although the characteristic function can be defined under
this approach for any arbitrary coalition formation rule, we will consider the specific
case of the gamma rule. Let, as before, πγ (S) denote the coalition structure in
which only S contains more than one player. Let Ψ (πγ (S)) be the sequential game
in which S moves first choosing an action xS ∈ XS and, at the second stage, the
other elements of πγ (S) simultaneously choose an element out of their respective
strategy sets. Let the function fN\S : XS → XN\S map a joint strategy xS of
coalition S into the Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (S, xS), with fj denoting its
projection on the j-th element:
fj (xS) ∈ argmax
xj∈Xj
uj(xS , xj , fk (xS)k∈N\S\j), ∀j ∈ N\S. (2)
A perfect equilibrium of Ψ (πγ (S)) is a pair (x∗S , fN\S) such that:
x∗S ∈ argmax
xS∈XS
∑
i∈S
ui(xS , fN\S(xS)). (3)
We denote by x∗ (S) the strategy profile (x∗S , fN\S(x∗S)). The assumption of con-
tinuous payoffs and the closedness property of the Nash correspondence graph (see,
for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)) imply that S faces a continuous maxi-
mization problem in (3) so that, by Weiestrass’ theorem, a perfect equilibrium of
Ψ (πγ (S)) always exists. The characteristic function is here defined by assigning
to each coalition S its aggregate payoff at the relevant perfect equilibrium:
vφ(S) =
∑
i∈S
ui (x∗ (S)) . (4)
2.4 Sequential versus Simultaneous Conversion
In this section we examine the relation between the core of the cooperative games
obtained under the simultaneous and sequential conversions of a given strategic
form game Γ (henceforth, simultaneous and sequential cores). We first note that
since the joint strategy x¯S is a feasible choice for S in the maximization problem
(3), and since x¯N\S = fN\S (x¯S), it follows that vφ (S) ≥ vσ (S) for all S ⊂ N .
In turns, this implies that the sequential core is weakly included in the simultaneous
core. A more interesting question is whether this inclusion is strict under additional
assumptions on the game Γ .
Assumption 1. The function ui is twice differentiable, i = 1, 2, ..., n.
Given differentiability of payoffs, we can write the equilibrium change in S’s payoff
induced by a change in the strategy of its i-th member at a point x in the interior of
X as follows:
duS (x)
dxi
=
∑
j∈N\S
[
∂uS (x)
∂xi
+
∂fj (xS)
∂xi
∂uS (x)
∂xj
]
.
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Considering the Nash equilibrium x¯ of the game Γ (πγ (S)) (provided this is inte-
rior), we can use an envelope argument to express the change in S’s payoff induced
by an infinitesimal change dxS in its joint strategy:
duS (x¯) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N\S
[
∂fj (x¯S)
∂xi
∂uS (x¯)
∂xj
]
dxi.
It follows that coalition S can strictly increase its payoff with respect to the Nash
payoff at x¯ whenever the term
(
∂fj(x¯S)
∂xi
∂uS(x¯)
∂xj
)
is non-null for some i ∈ S and j ∈
N\S. Under this condition, vφ (S) > vγ (S). The term ∂fj(x¯S)∂xi can be obtained by
implicit differentiation of the first order necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium
of the game Γ (S, x¯S):
∂fj (x¯S)
∂xi
= −
∂2uj(x¯)
∂xi∂xj
+
∑
k =j
k∈N\S
∂2uj(x¯)
∂xk∂xj
∂fk(x¯S)
∂xi
∂2uj(x¯)
∂x2
j
.
This leads to the following result:
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a strategic form game Γ satisfying assumption 1 and such
that, for all S ⊂ N , the Nash equilibrium of the game Γ (S, x¯S) is unique and
interior. For all S ⊂ N , let ∂2uj(x¯)∂xi∂xj 	= 0 for at least one player i ∈ S and one
player j for which ∂uS(x¯)∂xj 	= 0. Then, either the cores of the associated games
(N, vφ) and (N, vγ) are both empty or the former is strictly included in the latter.
Proof. >From the above discussion, under the assumptions of this proposition, for
all S we have vφ(S) > vγ(S). We also already know that C (N, vφ) ⊆ C (N, vσ).
Then we just need to show that C (N, vφ) \C (N, vγ) 	= ∅. Note first that being
defined by a series of linear weak inequalities, the set C (N, vγ) is closed and
convex. The boundary of C (N, vγ) contains all allocations z ∈ Rn such that∑
i∈S
zi = vγ (S) for some S ⊂ N . By closedness of C (N, vγ), such boundary is in-
cluded in C (N, vγ). Since vγ (S) < vφ (S), we can thus pick an arbitrary allocation
w on the boundary relative to S, for which
∑
i∈S
wi = vγ (S). Since vγ (S) < vφ (S),
it follows that S improves upon w and w /∈ C (N, vφ).
3 A Class of Games with a Nonempty Core
In this section we identify a class of games allowing for a nonempty core under the
sequential conversion. Here, the issue of existence is of particular interest; as sug-
gested by the Cournot example presented in the introduction, the increased power
of deviating coalitions with respect to the simultaneous conversion could yield an
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empty core. In particular, this can happen in games with strategic substitutes. We
show in theorem 1 that all symmetric smooth games with strategic complements
have a nonempty core. This existence result, when applied to the simultaneous con-
version, can itself be regarded as a new contribution (we note here that the only ex-
istence result for the core of (N, vγ) was obtained by construction by Chander and
Tulkens (1997) for a multilateral externalities game with quasilinear preferences).
An intuitive exposition of the proof is as follows. Games with strategic comple-
ments have the property that Stackelberg followers are better off than leaders. This
is a wellknown result for symmetric duopolies (see, for instance, Gal-Or (1985)),
and is extended to our setting of n players in lemmas 1 and 2. Suppose that a coali-
tion, acting as leader, could improve on the efficient equal split allocation. Since
every follower is better off than every leader, the sum of payoffs after the deviation
would exceed the sum of the equal split allocation, violating efficiency of the latter.
Given differentiability of payoff functions, strategic complementarity is equiva-
lent to the following condition:
∂2ui (x)
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i 	= j, ∀x ∈ X. (5)
A wellknown theorem by Milgrom and Roberts (1990) directly implies that if pay-
offs satisfy (5) then the function fN\S is non decreasing in xS (see Theorem 4.2.2
in Topkis (1998)).3
For our main result, stated in theorem 1, we need some additional assumptions.
Assumption 2. (Symmetric players). Players have identical strategy sets and pay-
off functions in the following sense: there exists X such that Xi = X for all
i ∈ N and a function u : X ×Xn−1 → R such that u(x, y) = ui(xi, xN\i) for all
i ∈ N and for all [(x, y) , (xi, xN\i)] ∈ Xn ×Xn such that (x, y) = (xi, xN\i).
Assumption 3. (Symmetric externality). Either ∂ui(x)
∂xj
≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N and
x ∈ X or ∂uj(x)
∂xi
≤ 0 for all i, j ∈ N and x ∈ X .
Assumption 4. (Strict concavity). ui(x) strictly concave in xi for all i ∈ N .
Assumption 2 requires that all players are identical in the sense that they all have
the same strategy set and identical preferences over their own strategies and their
competitors’ strategies. The second assumption has been shown to play a crucial role
in various cooperative game theory results (see, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts
(1996), Yi (1999)), and requires that the sign of the effect of each player’s action on
3 In order to apply this result, we here exploit the fact that R is a chain (which, together with
condition (8), implies that the game is supermodular) and the assumption of a unique Nash
equilibrium (that implies that f N\S is singlevalued, so that the greatest and least elements
coincide).
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the payoff of the rest of players is the same. We will denote the case of a positive sign
as ”positive externality” and the case of a negative sign as ”negative externality”.
To simplify notation, for a given action profile xS we will denote by
(
xS\i, y
)
the vector (x1, ...xi−1, y, xi+1, .., xs).
Lemma 1. Let S ⊂ N and consider x∗ (S).
(a) If externalities are positive, then i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S imply x∗i ≥ x∗j ;
(b) If externalities are negative, then i ∈ S and j ∈ N\S imply x∗i ≤ x∗j .
Proof. (a). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose x∗i < x∗j for some i ∈ S and
j ∈ N\S. The next series of inequalities follows:
∂ui
(
x∗S , x
∗
N\S
)
∂xi
>
∂ui
(
x∗S\i, x
∗
j , x
∗
N\S
)
∂xi
≥
∂ui
(
x∗S\i, x
∗
j , x
∗
(N\S)\j , x
∗
i
)
∂xi
=
∂uj
(
x∗S , x
∗
N\S
)
∂xj
= 0 (6)
The first inequality follows by the strict concavity (assumption 4); the second by
condition (5); the third by assumption 2, and the fourth by the equilibrium conditions
defining the equilibrium reaction function fN\S . Note next that every i ∈ S first
order condition of problem (3) can be rewritten as
∑
h∈S

∂uh (x∗)
∂xi
+
∑
j∈N\S
∂uh (x∗)
∂xj
∂fj (x∗S)
∂xi

 ≡ 0. (7)
Let us examine an arbitrary element h of the summation over S in (7): by the as-
sumption of case (a) of this lemma, the first term is non-negative if h 	= i; moreover,
by (6), this term is strictly positive for h = i. This facts, together with the fact that
fN\S is increasing, imply that condition (7) can be satisfied only if ∂uh(x
∗)
∂xj
< 0 for
some h ∈ S, which contradicts the assumption of the lemma.
(b). The same contradiction argument used for case (a) can be proved by invert-
ing the inequality signs in (6) in the appropriate manner.
Lemma 2. Let S ⊂ N and consider x∗(S). If j ∈ N\S and i ∈ S then uj(x∗) ≥
ui(x∗).
Proof. The following inequalities hold for all j ∈ N\S and i ∈ S:
uj
(
x∗S , x
∗
N\S
)
≥ uj
(
x∗S , x
∗
(N\S)\j , x
∗
i
)
≥ uj
(
x∗S\i, x
∗
j , x
∗
(N\S)\j , x
∗
i
)
. (8)
The first part is implied by condition (2), while the second follows from lemma 1
and assumption (3). By the assumption of symmetric players, we also have
uj
(
x∗S\i, x
∗
j , x
∗
(N\S)\j , x
∗
i
)
= ui
(
x∗S , x
∗
N\S
)
. (9)
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Inequalities (8) and (9) imply
uj (x∗) ≥ ui (x∗) ,
which proves the result.
Theorem 1. Let the game Γ satisfy assumptions 1-4 and exhibit strategic comple-
mentarity. Then, the associate cooperative game (N, vφ) has a nonempty core.
Proof. We prove the theorem showing that the equal split allocation giving vφ (N)
n
to each player in N is in the core of the game (N, vφ). Suppose not, so that vφ (S) >
vφ (N) for some S ⊂ N . By lemma 2, the maximal payoff of players in S is weakly
lower than the minimal payoff of players in N\S. This implies that
∑
j∈N\S uj (x
∗)
n− s ≥
∑
i∈S ui (x
∗)
s
=
vφ (S)
s
,
so that
vφ (S)
s
>
vφ (N)
n
⇒
∑
j∈N\S uj (x
∗)
n− s >
vφ (N)
n
.
This in turns implies that
s
∑
i∈S ui (x
∗)
s
+ (n− s)
∑
j∈N\S uj (x
∗)
n− s > s
vφ (N)
n
+ (n− s) vφ (N)
n
or ∑
i∈N
ui (x∗) > vφ (N)
which contradicts efficiency of vφ(N).
The following corollary directly follows from the fact that vφ(S) ≥ vγ(S) for
all S.
Corollary 1. Let the game Γ satisfy assumptions 1-4and exhibit strategic comple-
mentarity. Then, the associate cooperative game (N, vγ) has a nonempty core..
4 Discussion and Applications
Theorem 1 establishes sufficient conditions for the non emptiness of the sequential
core defined in the present paper. The main condition, strategic complementarity in
the sense of Bulow et al. (1985), is a property of the game in strategic form un-
derlying the cooperative game. Crucial to our result is the wellknown property of
games with strategic complements to generate nondecreasing best replies; in par-
ticular, the supermodularity of payoff functions implies that the Nash responses of
players outside a forming coalition are a nondecreasing function of the strategies
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of coalitional members. In line with some well established results in the theory of
industrial organization, this property ensures that excluded players, acting as fol-
lowers, are better off than players in the leading coalition.4 Deviations by proper
subcoalitions of players are therefore not very profitable, while the grand coalition,
not affected by this ”deviator’s curse”, produces a sufficiently big aggregate payoff
for stable cooperative outcomes to exist.
In this section we discuss our result and its main requirement in relation to
some notable economic applications of game theory: Cournot oligopolies, Bertrand
oligopolies and public goods economies. The analysis of Cournot games clearly il-
lustrates the mechanics at work in theorem 1: as long as best replies are such that
leading coalitions have not a ”too” big positional advantage, stable cooperative out-
comes exist. Bertrand games are traditionally games with strategic complements.
We discuss them here as an example of the property of the sequential core to act as
a refinement of the simultaneous core (see proposition 1). Finally, we work out an
example replicating the economy with multilateral externalities studied by Chander
and Tulkens (1997). This case is interesting both because it first motivated the use
of the gamma core solution concept (see the exhaustive discussion in their paper)
and because it generates a game with strategic substitutes for which the sequential
core is empty although the simultaneous core is always nonempty.
4.1 Cournot Games
Some recent contributions (Amir (1996), see also Vives (2000)) have shown that the
sufficient condition for a Cournot game without costs to be log-supermodular (and
so best replies to be increasing) is a log-convex inverse demand function P (.). Fol-
lowing Amir’s example, consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with inverse de-
mand function P (X) = (X + 1)−α, where X is aggregate production and α ≥ n,
with zero production costs and no capacity limits. In this case the Cournot game
is log-supermodular, best reply functions are increasing and have a unique sym-
metric intersection. For this case, our theorem 1 implies that the sequential core is
nonempty. This can be easily checked by assigning the numerical values n = 3 and
α = 3; in this case, the characteristic function under the sequential conversion is
v(S) =
α−2α
α− 1
(
α2 − α + (1− α) (n− s))α .
It can be shown that the term v(S)
s
is monotonically increasing in s; the equal split
allocation giving
v(N)
n
=
(α− 1)α−1 α−α
3
to all players is therefore contained in the core. As shown by Amir (1996), intro-
ducing linear costs can make the game non log-supermodular and best replies non
4 More precisely, lemma 2 proves that each outside players is better off than each coalitional
member at the relevant sequential equilibrium.
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monotonic. As an example, let costs of each firm be defined by the term x
4
. It is
immediately clear that, for n = 2 and α = 1,
v({i}) = .104 > .0261 = v(N)
n
implying that the core is empty.
However, the (sufficient) condition used in theorem 1 is far from being minimal:
it is easy to construct examples of games with strategic substitutes and for which
core allocations exist. A simple Cournot example can be used to illustrate how the
same mechanics underlying the result of theorem 1 determine the nonemptiness of
the core when strategies are substitutes. In particular, the core is nonempty when
best replies are not too decreasing or, in other terms, when strategies are not too
substitute. This in turn requires that the profit function does not decrease too much
with other firms’ output, a property mainly depending on the level of log-concavity
of the inverse demand function P (.). To show this, let P (X) = (a−X)β , with
a > X (for α = 1, this becomes the usual linear demand case). Note that P (.)
is log-concave (and the game is not log-supermodular) for β > 0, and best replies
are decreasing. When production costs are zero, the Cournot game admits a unique
Nash equilibrium x¯ with xi = aβ+n for every i ∈ N . Also, very simple algebra
yields the following characteristic function:
v (S) = aβ+1β2β (β + 1)−β−1 (β + n− s)−β .
By computing the difference between the equal split allocation and what a single
player obtains by deviating as leader, we get
vφ (N)
n
− vφ ({i}) = ββ (β + n− 1)−β n− 1 < 0⇔ β < 1.
It follows that when the demand is strictly concave (β < 1) the core is empty. How-
ever, when β = 1, the core is nonempty with the equal split allocation as a unique
element. It is also easy to show that for β > 1 (convex inverse demand) the equal
split allocation still belongs to the core. We conclude that in this case nonemptiness
of the core only requires a not too strong log-concavity of P (.). This ensures that
the marginal revenue of each firm does not decrease too much with the rivals’ out-
put and hence a deviating coalition, by expanding its output as leader (see lemma 1)
does not exploit too much its first mover advantage against complementary players.
When this is the case, the sequential core of a Cournot game, which is a natural
”strategic substitute” game, turns out to be nonempty.
4.2 Bertrand Games
Consider first the traditional symmetric Bertrand game with a homogeneous good,
with market demand D (p) = a − p, a > p and cost function C (x) = x22 . At the
unique Bertrand equilibrium, the price equals the average cost. It follows that the
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core of the associated game (N, vγ) includes all Pareto efficient allocations, corre-
sponding to all possible distributions of the value vγ (N) = 12a
2 n
2n+1 . The sequen-
tial conversion yields the characteristic function vφ(S) = 12s
a2
1+2n+n2−s2 , directly
implying that C(N, vφ) ⊂ C(N, vγ) (to see this, note that all imputations giving
less than 12
a2
2n+n2 to at least one player are not in the core of the game (N, vφ)).
The more complex case of differentiated goods can be used to illustrate the effect
of complementarity on the relation between the simultaneous and sequential core.
Denecker and Davidson (1985) show that when cartels (or mergers) and the fringe
of outside firms set their price a` la Nash, cartels are increasingly profitable in the
number of members. Moreover, they also show that merging is more convenient for
low degrees of product differentiation. Using the present paper’s terminology, their
theorem 2 proves that the term vγ (S)
s
for their game is monotonically increasing in
s, implying that the core of the associated game (N, vγ) always contains at least the
equal split allocation.
Turning now to the sequential conversion, note first that all assumption in propo-
sition 1 for strict inclusion of the sequential core are satisfied in the above example.
To have a more precise idea of the effect of the degree of good differentiation on the
relation between the core of the games (N, vφ) and (N, vγ), consider the following
example of a symmetrically differentiated triopoly with inverse demand function
given by pi = a − xi − b
∑
j =i
xj . Note that (see Bloch (1995) and Shubik and
Leviatan (1980) goods are complements for the range of b ∈ [((n− 1) /n) , 0] and
substitutes for b ∈ [0, 1]. Taking the direct demand function xi = α−βpi+γ
∑
j =i
pj ,
with α = a(n−1)b+1 , β =
1−(n−2)b
(1−b)((n−1)b+1) and γ =
b
(1−b)((n−1)b+1) , we obtain the
following coalitional values:
vγ ({i}) = 14
α2β
(β − γ)2 , vφ ({i}) =
1
4
α2 (2β + γ)2
(2β− γ)
(
2β2− βγ− 2γ2
) , i = 1, 2, 3
vγ ({i, j}) =
α
(
2β2 − γβ − γ2
)
(
2β2 − 2γβ − γ2
) , vφ ({i, j}) = 12 α
2
(
2β − βγ − γ2
)
(2β + γ)(
2β2 − γ2 − 2βγ
)2
vγ ({1, 2, 3}) = 34
α2
(β − 2γ) , vφ ({1, 2, 3}) =
3
4
α2
(β − 2γ) .
Numerical simulations show that when goods from complements (b ≤ 0) become
substitutes (0 < b ≤ 1), the worth of every single firm as leader vφ ({i}) increases
slightly more than its worth in the simultaneous case vγ ({i}), while for every inter-
mediate coalition (see figure below), vφ ({i, j}) (thick line) increases substantially
more than vγ ({i, j}) (thin line). As a consequence, for lower degrees of product
differentiation, the sequential core becomes increasingly smaller than the simulta-
neous core. This is in line with intuition: in price competition, when goods become
increasingly substitute, there is a higher incentive to reply to a rivals’ rise of price
with an even higher rise. A higher degree of strategic complementarity implies more
upward sloping best replies. There is thus less incentive for deviating coalitions to
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leave the grand coalition as Stackelberg leaders and, as a result, the sequential core
shrinks.
4.3 Public Goods Economies
Consider an economy with two commodities, a public good q and a private good y.
The set of agents is N = {1, 2, ., i, ., n}. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with the
amount wi of the private good. The public good is produced by each agent i out of
the private good, with convex cost function
C(q) =
q2
2
.
We let q = (qi)i∈N and Q =
∑
N qi. Quasilinear preferences are represented by
the utility function
ui(q, xi) = (Q− αQ2) + yi.
For this economy, the efficient production of public good implied by Samuelson’s
conditions is
Q∗ =
n2
1 + 2n2α
.
This setup is formally equivalent to the one considered by Chander and Tulkens
(1997), and satisfies their assumption 1” for α ≥ 12 . This implies, by their main the-
orem, that for this range of values of α the gamma core (or simultaneous core in the
present paper’s terminology) is nonempty and includes the unique efficient alloca-
tion in which production costs are shared according to relative marginal valuations
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of the public good at the efficient production levels (q∗1 , ..., q∗n):
yi = wi − v
′
i (Q
∗)∑
j∈N v
′
j (Q∗)
∑
j∈N
q∗j
2
= wi − 1
n
(
Q∗
n
)2
. (10)
We will show that for this economy the sequential core is empty. We proceed by
showing that each player, by deviating alone as a Stackelberg leader, improves upon
the allocation given by (10). We do not solve the whole maximization problem of a
single leader. It is sufficient to show that there exists one strategy for player i which
gives him a higher payoff than the proposed allocation, given the equilibrium reac-
tion functions of the other (n− 1) agents. Consider then the strategy of producing
a zero amount of public good, i.e., qi = 0. The reaction fN\i(qi = 0) is given by
the following first order conditions:
1− 2αqj (n− 1) = qj , ∀j 	= i,
yielding
qj =
1
1 + 2α (n− 1) , ∀j 	= i
and, aggregating, a total produced public good equal to
Q =
n− 1
1 + 2α (n− 1) .
We are now able to compare agent i’s payoff after his deviation, or, in other terms,
the value vφ ({i}), with his payoff in the proposed allocation given in (10), that we
label u∗i :
u∗i =
n2
1 + 2n2α
− α
[
n2
1 + 2n2α
]2
+ wi − 12n
(
n
1 + 2n2α
)2
;
vφ ({i}) = n− 11 + 2α (n− 1) + wi − α
[
n− 1
1 + 2α (n− 1)
]2
.
It can be checked that vφ ({i}) > u∗i for n ≥ 2 and α ≥ 0.5, implying that the
allocation given by (10) is not in the sequential core. The following table reports
figures for some values of n and α = 0.5:
n 2 10 50 100
vφ ({i})− u∗i 0.224 0.8 0.96 0.98 .
This result directly implies that for this economy the core of the game (N, vφ) is
empty. Since
∑
i∈N u
∗
i ≥
∑
i∈N ui (q, yi) for all feasible vectors (q, y1, ..., yn), it
follows that every other feasible imputation z is such zj < u∗j for some j (z) ∈ N .
Since we have shown that vφ ({i}) − u∗i > 0 for all i ∈ N , it follows that every
feasible imputation z is objected by players j(z) and is therefore not in the core.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed a sequential approach to the determination of the
characteristic function in games with externalities. The appropriateness of this ap-
proach depends on the strategic context in which players choose their actions. The
sequential conversion seems appropriate in settings in which players’ actions are
perfectly monitored and players can fully commit to their strategies. In these cases,
the derived characteristic function simply formalizes the assumption that a forming
coalition anticipates the (optimal) reaction of outside players who face its forma-
tion as a fait accompli. On the other hand, a simultaneous conversion seems ap-
propriate when the formation of a deviating coalition can be monitored before its
strategy choice, and all strategies are chosen only once the new coalition structure
has formed. The sequential structure of the game characterizing the payoff of form-
ing coalitions has proved useful to establish sufficient conditions for the nonempti-
ness of the core. The crucial property for nonemptiness (strategic complementarity)
is often encountered (and easily testable) in economic applications. Moreover, the
property of the sequential core to act as a refinement of the simultaneous core yields
interesting results in some economic examples.
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